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Minilateral and Managed Trade in the
Post-Uruguay Round World
CA. Primo Braga*
Alexander J. Yeats**
Recent discussion on free trade areas (FTAs) and other
minilateral1 associations has focused on whether such arrange-
ments will detract from further multilateral2 trade liberaliza-
tion on a most-favored-nation 3 (MFN) basis. However, much of
this debate has occurred in the absence of empirical information
relating to: (1) the global importance of minilateral arrange-
ments that have been, or are now being, formed; (2) the relative
size of other major bilateral trade flows not affected by mini-
lateral arrangements and their suitability for the minilateral
approach; (3) the global importance of Europe in promoting
* Economist, International Trade Division, World Bank, Washington,
D.C.
** Economist, International Trade Division, World Bank, Washington,
D.C. We would like to acknowledge comments and suggestions by R. Duncan,
J.M. Finger, B. Kaminski, P. Meo, V. Nehru and the editors of this Journal.
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions are the authors' own. They
should not be attributed to the World Bank, its Board of Directors, or its
management.
1. The term "minilateral arrangement" is used in this Article as encom-
passing any treaty negotiated by two or more trading partners which violates
the most-favored-nation (MFN) rule of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT). General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature
Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5, 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter
GATT]. For a discussion of MFN, see infra note 3. Unilateral concessions, such
as the Generalized Systems of Preferences (GSP) of industrialized countries, as
well as non-reciprocal contractual preferential arrangements (such as the Lom6
Convention), are not considered as falling under this definition.
2. Multilateral trade negotiations are the type used under the GATT.
They involve multi-party negotiations between all GATT members, as opposed
to a minilateral trading arrangement involving a small number of countries.
3. The concept of MFN is a major tenet of the GATT. Under the MFN
provision, each member is obligated to treat all other GATT members at least
as well as it treats any other country with regard to imports and exports. GATT
art. 1:1. Theoretically, this concept is advantageous to world trade in that a
negotiated reduction in tariffs between two or more countries will also benefit
all GATT member countries and reduce the total incidence of world-wide tariffs.
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minilateral arrangements; and (4) the threat of other types of
arrangements, such as "managed trade" initiatives. 4
In this Article, we tabulate and analyze the implications of
statistics on the global importance of trade which now occurs
under minilateral arrangements. We then compare these re-
sults with the major trade flows which still occur outside these
arrangements. Using data recently compiled by the United Na-
tions, our analysis demonstrates that the global importance of
minilateral arrangements is presently far greater than is often
recognized; almost one-half of world trade is affected by mini-
lateral arrangements. Thus, our analysis reveals that the con-
cerns expressed about a further spread of minilateral
arrangements weakening the multilateral negotiation process
are at best tardy; minilateral arrangements are larger than is
generally realized and presently encompass trade flows
equivalent to those that occur on an MFN basis. Therefore, we
argue that the alarms now being raised are tantamount to lock-
ing the barn door after the horse has escaped.
However, we also demonstrate that, contrary to popular be-
lief, the further expansion of FTAs will be negligible. Our analy-
sis of the major bilateral trade flows that are not covered by
FTAs reveals that these flows are not appropriate candidates for
minilateral agreements because they are dominated by impor-
tant country-specific problems. In particular, problems relating
to high-technology trade between the Asian "Newly Industrial-
ized Economies"5 (NIEs), Japan, and the United States, as well
as between the Asian NIEs, Japan, and Western Europe are suf-
ficient to hinder the formation of additional FTAs. Further-
more, our tabulations and analysis of the "discriminatory" trade
barriers applied to these flows indicates that "managed trade"6
is a far more likely outcome. Therefore, based on our analysis,
4. Managed trade initiatives specify quantitative trade targets, as in the
case of voluntary export restraint agreements (VERs). See infra note 6 for addi-
tional examples.
5. The Asian "Newly Industrialized Economies" consist of the Republic of
Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.
6. The term "managed trade" is used here to characterize arrangements
that specify quantitative trade targets (either for exports or imports). "Volun-
tary export restraints" (VERs), "orderly marketing agreements" (OMAs), "vol-
untary import expansion" agreements (VIEs) (e.g., the U.S.-Japan
Semiconductor Trade Agreement), and the "multi-fibre arrangement" (MFA)
are some of the main examples in this context. For a review of alternative defi-
nitions of managed trade, see Laura D'Andrea Tyson, Managed Trade: Making
the Best of the Second Best, in AN AMERICAN TRADE STRATEGY: OPTIONS FOR THE
1990s 142 (Robert Z. Lawrence & Charles L. Schultze eds., 1990), and Robert E.
Baldwin et al., Commentary, in AN AMERICAN TRADE STRATEGY, supra, at 195.
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we conclude that further expansion of minilateral arrangements
will not necessarily hinder multilateral negotiations under the
GATT.
The Article closes with an assessment of our findings for
post-Uruguay Round trade relations, highlighting the issue of
"high-tech" trade. The authors stress that this Article addresses
just one of the major concerns being expressed regarding FTAs:
that further spread of minilateral arrangements will detract
from or deter global efforts to reduce trade barriers in the GATT
multilateral negotiations. 7
I. DISSATISFACTION WITH MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
Over the last few years many analysts have expressed con-
cern over the growing dissatisfaction with multilateral trade ne-
gotiations (MTNs) as a means of achieving trade liberalization.8
However, this growing dissatisfaction has its roots in sources
other than minilateral trade arrangements. One source of this
dissatisfaction has been the pace of the GATT negotiations. The
Tokyo Round lasted seven years, from 1973 to 1979. The Uru-
guay Round started in 1986 and, while originally scheduled for
completion in 1990, an impasse at the Brussels Ministerial
Meeting in December 1990 led to its extension. The negotiations
were finally concluded on December 15, 1993. In contrast, the
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement 9 was completed in
7. For a legal analysis of the GATT, see OLIER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMI-
TATIONS IN THE GATT MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM (1987). There are other
related topics equally deserving of attention. For example, some developing
countries have attempted to utilize regional arrangements to stimulate indus-
trialization and growth. Such arrangements may be relatively unimportant
from a global perspective, but can be of key importance for the growth prospects
of the FTA member developing countries since they may have a negative impact
on growth if they reduce access to more economically efficient outside suppliers.
A further key concern is that some arrangements, such as the European Union
(EU) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), may actually
turn hostile to each other and impose new forms of trade barriers. For a list of
major regional integration arrangements, see infra Annex.
8. See C. MICHAEL AHo & JONATHAN DAVID ARONSON, TRADE TALKS:
AMERICA BETTER LISTEN (1986); Gardner Patterson, Implications for the GATT
and the World Trading System, in FREE TRADE AREAS AND U.S. TRADE POLICY
353 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 1989).
9. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 1, 1989, 27 I.L.M.
19941 233
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about eighteen months, and the recently signed Chile-Mexico
FTA was negotiated in less than one year.l°
A second problem is that the GATT multilateral negotia-
tions involve a large number of participating countries with very
diverse interests, which results in complicated MTN agendas."
A third concern is the GATT's de facto consensus rules.
Although each member of the GATT is entitled to one vote re-
gardless of its size or resources, decisions are made by consensus
of all members. 12 Many countries have used this system to
block the progress of negotiations until their individual de-
mands are satisfied.' 3
Moreover, problems relating to the functional aspects of the
GATT itself have contributed to the dissatisfaction with the
MTN approach. One set of functional concerns involves the na-
ture of the GATT rules and the efficacy of its enforcement mech-
anisms. Furthermore, criticisms often arise concerning the
deficiencies in the GATT. For example, trade in textiles and
clothing has evolved outside the GATT disciplines. Similarly,
the areas of agriculture and subsidies are not adequately ad-
dressed. Lastly, the proliferation of so called "grey area" meas-
10. The perception that the minilateral route is quicker than the multilat-
eral one, however, is not undisputed. It is worth remembering, for instance,
that the road to the single European market began to be "carved" almost four
decades ago. For a discussion of this theme, see Jagdish Bhagwati, Regional-
ism vs. Multilateralism, in NEW DIMENSIONS IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION 22
(Jaime de Melo & Arvind Panagariya eds., 1993).
11. On the eve of the Uruguay Round there were 92 contracting parties (67
of which were developing countries). The groups reporting to the Trade Negoti-
ating Committee during the first four years of the Uruguay Round encom-
passed the following themes: safeguards, dispute settlement, agriculture,
tropical products, natural resource-based products, textiles and clothing, tar-
iffs, non-tariff measures,. MTN agreements and arrangements, subsidies and
countervailing measures, GATT articles, functioning of the GATT system, trade
related aspects of intellectual property, trade-related investment measures,
and services.
12. GATT art. XXV.
13, For example, India and a few other developing countries blocked the
adoption of recommendations on intellectual property rights in the Ministerial
Declaration at the Montreal midterm review of the GATT negotiations in De-
cember 1988. According to Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott, "footdragging"
has become more acute as GATT talks focus more on the negotiation of trading
rules rather than on reciprocal trade liberalization. GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER &
JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, TRADING FOR GROWTH: THE NExT RouND OF TRADE NEGOTI-
ATIONS (1985). Schott argues that such problems would be far less important in
bilateral or minilateral negotiations among "like-minded" countries. Jeffrey J.
Schott, More Free Trade Areas?, in FREE TRADE AREAS AND U.S. TRADE POLICY,
supra note 8, at 1, 7.
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ures has also caused increased dissatisfaction with the GATT. 14
These measures, such as "voluntary" export restraints and or-
derly marketing arrangements, run counter to the spirit and
goal of the GATT.
The growing interest in "minilateral arrangements" has
been a direct result of the inherent weaknesses in the GATT dis-
cussed above. Government officials have viewed FTAs as both
an alternative and a complement to the GATT's multilateral ap-
proach. 15 Proponents of FTAs cite numerous advantages of ne-
gotiating with a limited number of countries willing to liberalize
trade bilaterally.1 6 The agenda in such negotiations can be
geared to the specific interests of the participants. Further-
more, compliance problems can be better addressed by the es-
tablishment of special administrative bodies, as in the Canada-
United States Free Trade Agreement, i7 to provide consultation
and dispute settlement mechanism for its members.
14. See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1987, at 154, 167
(1987). The expression "grey area measures" refers to those measures whose
conformity with GATT obligations are unclear.
15. While serving as U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, James Baker stated:
"If possible, we hope liberalization will occur in the Uruguay Round. If not, we
might be willing to explore a 'market liberalization club' approach through
minilateral arrangements or a series of bilateral agreements. In this fashion,
North America can build steady momentum for more open and efficient mar-
kets." James Baker, The Geopolitical Implications of the U.S. -Canada Trade
Pact, INT'L ECON., Jan.-Feb. 1988, at 35.
It should be noted that the U.S. emphasis has been on the establishment of
free trade areas, not customs unions. The latter involves two or more countries
which abolish all, or nearly all, trade restrictions among themselves and set up
a common and uniform barrier against outsiders. The European Union (EU), in
its initial stages, was an example of this type of arrangement. Once the ar-
rangement expands beyond the trade in goods, encompassing trade in services
and the movement of factors of production, it is referred to as a common
market.
In a free trade area, trade among member countries is also completely lib-
eralized, or nearly so. However, there is not a common trade barrier against
nonmember countries; each country is free to impose its own trade restrictions.
The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) is an example of this latter type
of arrangement.
The term "minilateral arrangement" is used in this Article as encompass-
ing any agreement negotiated by two or more trading partners which is con-
trary to the most-favored-nation (MFN) rule of the GATT. See supra note 3.
16. Such a conclusion is not extraordinary. One can easily imagine that
negotiations between two or three government officials with similar goals is
much more advantageous than talks among 96 diverse countries.
17. For details about dispute settlement in the Canada-United States Free
Trade Agreement, see Gilbert R. Winham, Dispute Settlement in NAFTA and
the FTA, in AssESSING NAFTA: A TRINATIONAL ANALYsIs 251 (Steve Globerman
& Michael Walker eds., 1993).
1994]
2MN. J GLOBAL TRADE
Jeffrey Schott suggests that FTAs have also been consid-
ered as a way to achieve specific policy objectives such as man-
aging trade deficits, reducing foreign barriers, eliminating the
"free rider" problem in multilateral negotiations, balancing bi-
lateral trade flows, or even establishing more favorable condi-
tions for multilateral agreements.' Although differences exist
on all but a few of these issues, the latter has been particularly
contentious. Specifically, many economists apparently view re-
cent FTA activity as a threat to the multilateral approach since
it channels liberalization efforts along alternative and possibly
conflicting lines. 19 However, this threat can only be properly as-
sessed by examining the GATT's treatment of FTAs and by ana-
lyzing both existing FTAs and the potential for new minilateral
arrangements through the remainder of the decade.
II. COMPILATION OF DATA AND METHODOLOGY
GATT regulations allow FTAs if certain conditions are met.
First, minilateral arrangements require notification and review
by all contracting parties to the General Agreement. 20 GATT
Article XXIV permits such departures from the MFN obligation
provided that the FTA or customs union meets three conditions:
(1) duties and other restrictive regulations are eliminated on
"substantially all" trade between partner countries; (2) the gen-
eral incidence of duties and regulations affecting third parties is
no higher after the establishment of an agreement; and (3) the
agreement contains a plan and schedule for its complete forma-
tion within a reasonable length of time.21 Although the intent of
these rules is sometimes interpreted to require a FTA to be
trade-creating, there is no guarantee that this will be the result.
18. See JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, INST. FOR INT'L ECONOMICS, MORE FREE TRADE
AREAS? 8 (1989). The "free rider" problem reflects the possibility that a con-
tracting party may benefit from reforms under the MFN principle without offer-
ing trade concessions. Developing countries have often been accused of taking a
"free ride" in the multilateral system.
19. See Paul Wonnacott & Mark Lutz, Is There a Case for Free Trade Ar-
eas?, in FREE TRADE AREAS AND U.S. TRADE POLICY, supra note 8, at 59; JAGDISH
BHAGWATI, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM AT RISK (1991).
20. For a detailed analysis of the GATT regulations concerning minilateral
arrangements, see Frieder Roessler, The Relationship Between Regional Inte-
gration Agreements and the Multilateral Trade Order, in REGIONAL INTEGRA-
TION AND THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 311, 325 (Kym Anderson & Richard
Blackhurst eds., 1993).
21. GATT art. XXIV.
236 [Vol. 3:231
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Since 1948, more than sixty minilateral arrangements have
been subject to this formal procedure. 22
A compilation of these minilateral reviews prepared by
Schott 23 provided the starting point for our analysis of global
trade "affected" by minilateral arrangements. 24 Next, an at-
tempt was made to include other quasi-minilateral arrange-
ments that had not been subject to the GATT review process. 25
Moreover, in an attempt to make our analysis as current as pos-
sible, we added the following new arrangements to the above
22. Schott, supra note 13, at 24. Only four agreements - the South Afri-
can-Rhodesian Customs Union (1948), the Nicaragua-El Salvador Agreement
(1951), Nicaraguan participation in the Central American Free Trade Area
(1958), and the Caribbean Community and Common Market (1973) - were de-
clared fully compatible with Article XXIV requirements. Id. However, no
agreement has been censured by a working group as being incompatible with
GATT rules. As a result of these precedents, countries are perceived to be able
to derogate from MFN obligations in FTAs without regard to the effects on third
countries. This impression has been reinforced by the introduction of the 1979
Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment: Reciprocity and
Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (the Enabling Clause). GATT Dis-
pute Resolution Panel, Differential and More Favourable Treatment: Reciproc-
ity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, GATT Doc. 114903, BISD
26th Supp. 203 (1979) [hereinafter Enabling Clause]. As a result of this deci-
sion, regional arrangements involving only developing countries are excluded
from the requirement to meet the formal criteria of Article XXIV. Regional ar-
rangements among these countries are permitted as long as they facilitate
trade, do not create "undue difficulties" for the trade of other countries, and do
not act as an impediment to the reduction or elimination of trade barriers on a
most-favored-nation basis. Formal procedures have not been established to en-
sure that these conditions are met. For further details, see Schott, supra, at
25.
23. See FREE TRADE AREAS AND U.S. TRADE POLICY, supra note 8, Annex at
376-383.
24. As mentioned before, other types of arrangements, like the GSP and
the Lom6 Regime, were excluded from these tabulations since they depart from
the typical FTA model and only apply to one-way trade (i.e., imports by indus-
trial countries). This exclusion will impart an upward bias to the residual
amount of MFN trade in global totals.
25. An example would be regional arrangements involving countries which
are not GATT members. It is also worth noting that developing countries have
experimented with inter-regional trade preferences from time to time. In the
mid-1970s, some 16 countries exchanged mutual trade preferences under the
provision of GATT's Protocol for Trade Relations Among Developing Countries.
In the 1980s, more than 60 developing countries exchanged trade preferences,
or established an institutional framework to do so, under the aegis of
UNCTAD's Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP) among developing
countries. Several less ambitious attempts have also been made such as the
Tripartite Arrangement involving India, Egypt and Yugoslavia. Our tabula-
tions of FTA trade excludes these arrangements, largely because of their special
nature and the difficulties in obtaining information on the trade they affect.
1994] 237
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data: the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)26
and the potential FTAs between Eastern European countries
and developed Europe.
At the time the data was compiled, the U.S.-Mexico and
Canada-Mexico trade flows comprising NAFTA27 were consid-
ered in anticipation of an agreement being ratified in the future.
Arrangements between Eastern and Western Europe, in turn,
were considered because a majority of these negotiations are at
an advanced stage and some form of agreement seems likely. In
fact, Poland, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (the former
Czechoslovakia), and Hungary have applied for associate Euro-
pean Economic Community (EEC) membership, and special
deals have been approved 28 or are pending with European Free
Trade Association (EFTA) members. 29 Furthermore, with
reunification, the former German Democratic Republic was ab-
sorbed into the European Community, providing duty free ac-
cess for manufactured goods exported to EFTA markets.
Recent developments in Latin America such as Mercosur30
and the Chile-Mexico FTA were not specifically included in our
tabulations. 31 The Mercosur intends to create a common market
encompassing Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay by the
26. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Mexico-
Canada, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
27. The U.S.-Canada trade flows have already been included under the
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement.
28. For further details, see GATT, GATT AcTIVITIES 1992, 85-92 (1993).
29. The estimate of "affected" trade flows between Eastern Europe and De-
veloped Europe should be interpreted with care (see Table 1). It assumes that
all trade between the former European COMECON members and high-income
European countries would be covered by preferential arrangements. Since, at
least in the near future, one should not expect such a broad array of FTAs, this
assumption tends to introduce an upward bias in the estimate. On the other
hand, it can be argued that the use of 1988 trade flows inserts a downward bias
in this figure. After all, the trade potential of Eastern European countries was
significantly hampered by the maze of controls which characterized their trade
relations with the West at that time.
30. Mercosur is the Southern Cone Common Market (Mercado Comun del
Sur).
31. Other prospective minilateral agreements in Latin America and the
Caribbean appear to be in a formative stage. For example, in January 1991
both Mexico and Venezuela announced their intention to negotiate bilateral
free trade agreements with several Central American countries by 1996; in
1991, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela also signed a trilateral framework for
liberalization of trade and investment flows. There are also ongoing attempts
to revitalize CARICOM, CACM, and the Andean Pact, although the prolifera-
tion of new minilateral arrangements is adding to the stress of the "old" initia-
tives, particularly the Andean Pact.
[Vol. 3:231
MINILATERAL A"D MANAGED TRADE
end of 1994.32 The Asuncion Treaty, signed in March 1991, es-
tablished this ambitious target date based on progress already
achieved in the Argentine-Brazilian Integration Program initi-
ated in 1986. 33 The September 1991 treaty for a Chile-Mexico
FTA, in turn, established a framework for the gradual reduction
of tariffs affecting bilateral trade over the next four years. 34 Ac-
cordingly, ninety percent of the goods traded between Chile and
Mexico are expected to be exchanged under duty free status by
the end of 1995.3 5 The approximate impact of these arrange-
ments can, however, be inferred from our data on the Latin
American Integration Association (LAIA)36 "affected" intra-re-
gional trade (see Table 1).
Once the data was collected, we utilized the "affected" trade
concept in our tabulations due to a lack of detailed information
on coverage of preferences. We assumed that all trade occurring
between members of a minilateral arrangement is affected by
the terms of the agreement. This simplified procedure does not
allow for exclusions and differential treatment by type of good
that typically exists under these agreements.37 For example,
some developing country arrangements allow for preferential
tariffs below MFN rates as opposed to duty free trade.38 Fur-
ther, the degree of product coverage varies significantly among
different agreements. For example, only forty percent of intra-
regional trade among LAIA members was conducted under pref-
erential terms as of 1988. 39 Nevertheless, the "affected" trade
32. For a brief description of Mercosur, see OECD, REGIONAL INTEGRATION
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 94-97 (1993).
33. For a brief description of this program, see C.A. Primo Braga, U.S. Poli-
cies and the Prospects for Latin American Economic Integration, in UNITED
STATES POLICIES AND THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIES 153 (Werner Baer &
Donald V. Coes eds., 1990).
34. OECD, supra note 32, at 93-94.
35. Id.
36. The Latin American Integration Association (LAIA) consists of Argen-
tina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uru-
guay, and Venezuela.
37. For example, the EC agreements with EFTA countries in the 1970s did
not include agricultural products. See Paul Luyten, Multilateralism Versus
Preferential Bilateralism: A European View, in FREE TRADE AREAS AND U.S.
TRADE POLICY, supra note 8, at 271.
38. For example, ASEAN or LAIA.
39. See INTERAMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PRO-
GRESS IN LATIN AMERICA: 1989 REPORT 72 (1989). It is worth emphasizing,
however, that if Mercosur and other planned FTA initiatives, such as the Chile-
Mexico FTA, evolve as planned, they will significantly increase the proportion
of intra-regional trade in Latin America which is exchanged under preferential
terms.
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concept provides more than adequate results for the purpose of
our analysis.
Raw data required for measuring the importance of these
minilateral arrangements was drawn from three different
sources. The base for our analysis was provided by UNCTAD,
which estimated total world exports for 1988 and other years. 40
UNCTAD also provided similar statistics for trade in broad
classes of goods like manufactures or energy products.41 This
source also provided detailed data on major trade flows, such as
the intra-trade of EFTA and EU countries, trade between Eu-
rope and Japan, and trade between Japan and North America
which greatly assisted our tabulations of "affected" and non-af-
fected trade. Second, Andras Inotai compiled data on intra-
trade among developing countries' existing regional arrange-
ments.42 In situations where required data were not available
from either of these two sources, such as trade under the United
States-Israel FTA, it was compiled directly by the authors from
United Nations Series D Trade Tapes.
4 3
III. THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF
MINILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS
Employing the three statistical sources discussed in the pre-
vious section, Table 1 tabulates information on the relative im-
portance of exports that occur under existing minilateral
arrangements. Table 1 shows the actual total value of 1988 "af-
fected" trade that occurs within the framework of these arrange-
ments and each specific flow's share of world trade. Similar
statistics are given for all non-energy goods44 and all manufac-
40. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT
(UNCTAD), HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT STATIS-
TICS, 1990, Annex A, Table Al.
41. Id.
42. ANDRAS INOTAI, REGIONAL INTEGRATION AMONG DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(PRE Working Paper, WPS 643, World Bank, 1991).
43. There are some inconsistencies between the data sources employed in
these tabulations, but it is anticipated that their overall effects are relatively
small. Inotai, supra note 42, employed IMF (Direction of Trade) and OECD
statistics for his tabulations and these data may differ from United Nations
trade statistics. For a detailed analysis of the importance of these differences,
see Jerzy Rozanski & Alexander Yeats, On the (In)Accuracy of Economic Obser-
vations: An Assessment of Trends in the Reliability of International Trade Sta-
tistics, paper presented at a Ford Foundation Conference (1992) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the authors). The data published in UNCTAD, supra
note 40, reflects United Nations trade data.
44. This category includes products classified in the Standard Interna-
tional Trade Classification (SITC) classes 0 to 9, excluding SITC 3.
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tures.45 To assist in evaluating this information, separate sub-
totals are shown for arrangements involving Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, de-
veloping countries, and Eastern Europe.
Perhaps the key point to be extrapolated from the data in
Table 1 concerns the relative importance of European integra-
tion efforts when viewed from a global perspective. In 1988, the
preferential trade of Western Europe accounted for about $0.9
trillion, which was thirty-one percent of world trade, or about
thirty-four percent of global manufactures trade.46 Another in-
teresting point is that the EC and EFTA combined arrange-
ments dwarf the current formation of a North American free
trade area. At $195 billion, the intra-trade of the NAFTA coun-
tries is less than one-quarter of Europe's. From a global per-
spective, arrangements between developing countries are
minuscule - they affected roughly three percent of world ex-
ports in 1988.
Overall, the completed, or nearly completed, arrangements
listed in Table 1 encompassed more than forty percent of world
exports in 1988. Furthermore, if we include NAFTA and the po-
tential new arrangements, the share of "affected" world trade in
all goods would be as high as forty-six percent and approxi-
mately fifty percent for trade in manufactures. Therefore, a
clear message is that while the further spread of regional inte-
gration efforts may threaten the multilateral negotiations pro-
cess, a more imposing threat is that these arrangements, which
are now so globally expansive, could turn hostile to each other.
A further point to consider is that these established arrange-
ments provide a disincentive for members to engage in multilat-
eral negotiations that will lower MFN tariffs since these
reductions would reduce the established preference margins
45. Manufactured goods are defined as SITC 5 to 8, excluding SITC 68
(non-ferrous metals). For further details on products classification, see
UNCTAD, supra note 40.
46. A point often missed is that a special protocol between the EC and
EFTA has allowed for duty-free trade in manufactured goods between members
of these two blocks since 1973. Trade in some agricultural goods also occurs on
a preferential basis between EC and EFTA countries. The data in Table 1 has
been prepared to reflect these intra-European arrangements. In October 1991,
EC and EFTA countries agreed on the establishment of the European Economic
Area. This treaty provides for the free movement of goods (with significant ex-
ceptions in agriculture), services, labor, and capital in Western Europe, and
partial adoption of the EC's acquis communautaire (i.e., the secondary legisla-
tion that guides the process of integration) by the EFTA countries. See MIRANDA
XAFA ET AL., THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S TRADE AND TRADE-RELATED INDUS-
TRIAL Poucrs (International Monetary Fund Working Paper, 1992).
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they receive in each other's markets as a result of minilateral
negotiations.
Table 1: Value and Share of Merchandise World Trade Under
Minilateral Arrangements
Share of 1988 Trade (%) Value of 1988 Trade ($million)
All
All Manu- All All
All Non-Oil fac- All Non-Oil Manufac-
Items Goods tures Items Goods tures
Total World Exports 100.00 100.00 100.00 2,829,098 2,562,252 1,980,066
OECD Related
Arrangements
Intra/trade of Dev.
Europe
United States and
Canada
EEC Regional
Arrangements
EFTA and Turkey
(a)
United States and
Israel
Australia and New
Zealand
Australia and
Papua New
Guinea
Developing Country
Arrangements
Hong Kong-China
ASEAN
LAIA
Gulf Cooperation
Council
Economic Commu-
nity West Africa
Central American
Common Market
SADCC
Maghreb
CARICOM
UDEAC
Total Trade Flows
38.66 40.62 42.06 1,093,644 1,040,692
32.30
5.49
1.98
0.51
0.21
0.10
0.02
34.02
5.20
1.96
0.54
0.24
0.08
0.01
863,405
150,391
57,976
12,985
5,507
2,795
585
30.52
5.32
2.05
0.46
0.19
0.10
0.02
2.74 3.13
1.27 1.40
0.80 1.06
0.37 0.40
0.16 0.16
0.05 0.04
0.02 0.02
0.02 0.01
0.02 0.02
0.02 0.01
0.01 0.01
41.40 43.75
Under Minilateral
Arrangements
Potential New 4.42
Arrangements
United States and 1.54
Mexico
Canada and Mexico 0.05
Eastern Europe and 2.83
Dev. Europe
4.11
1.54
0.05
2.52
827,715
140,562
50,853
12,952
5,449
2,646
515
3.13 77,619 80,320
1.64 36,012 35,995
0.95 22,648 27,191
0.32 10,562 10,149
0.13 4,650 4,170
0.03 1,513 953
0.02 570 567
0.01 537 375
0.01 517 440
0.01 426 320
0.01 184 160
45.18 1,171,263 1,121,012
4.07 124,911 105,338
1.56 43,460 39,449
0.05 1,439 1,388
2.46 80,012 64,501
832,759
673,702
103,028
38,803
10,625
4,730
1,612
259
61,918
32,427
18,783
6,376
2,560
650
422
210
200
170
120
894,677
80,666
30,934
1,002
48,730
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Trade Flows Under 45.82 47.86 49.26 1,296,174 1,226,350 975,343
Potential and
Existing Arrange-
ments
Memo Item: Col- 4.87 4.16 3.67 137,879 106,644 72,749
lapsed Arrange-
ments
Eastern Europe 4.47 3.78 3.45 126,459 96,775 68,357
Intra-Trade
Eastern Europe and 0.40 0.39 0.22 11,420 9,869 4,392
Cuba
Turkey and EFTA signed a free trade agreement in October 1991. This arrange-
ment came into force in April 1992.
Notes: Data compiled from UNCTAD, supra note 40, and Inotai, supra note 42,
with some statistics drawn directly from the United Nations COMTRADE data
base. Developed Europe and Cuba were reporters in the COMTRADE base and
are the sources for Eastern European data on these trade flows. For some of the
developing country arrangements (SADCC, UDEA, etc.) manufactures and non-
oil trade values were estimated by applying the share of these goods in a previous
year to the 1988 trade totals. The 1976 Bangkok agreement (Bangladesh, India,
Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka and Laos) was not included because at present only
three percent of the members' intra-trade is exchanged under tariff preferences.
The above tabulation consider the exchange of goods between EEC member states
to constitute international trade. If the EEC were assumed to be a single unit,
the global share of merchandise trade under existing and potential FTAs would
be about 31%.
Eastern European preferential trade arrangements, which
existed until the collapse of the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA) in 1991, are also reported as a memo item in
Table 1. It is worth mentioning that in 1992 Poland, Hungary
and the former Czechoslovakia established the Central Euro-
pean Cooperation Committee and announced their intention to
negotiate a new FTA among themselves. 47
IV. THE POTENTIAL SPREAD OF MINILATERAL
ARRANGEMENTS
Table 2 provides additional information relating to the point
that the threat from the further spread of regional arrangements
may have been exaggerated and the actual importance of estab-
lished arrangements overlooked. The table identifies major bi-
47. The former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic was dissolved, but the
Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic established a customs union that en-
tered in force on January 1, 1993. Another example of regionalism in Eastern
Europe is provided by ongoing discussions concerning the establishment of the
Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone (BSECZ). Originally conceived in 1990,
the BSECZ has been enlarged to accommodate several new states born from the
disintegration. of the Soviet Union. Its membership now includes: Albania, Ar-
menia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Tur-
key, and Ukraine. See GATT, supra note 28, at 89.
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MNIAr ERAL AND MANAGED TRADE
lateral trade flows not currently affected by existing minilateral
arrangements (i.e., North America-Japan, North America-De-
veloped Western Europe, Japan-Developed Western Europe,
etc.). Table 2 also indicates the 1988 value and global share of
this exchange. Similar tabulations are also shown for trade in
all non-energy goods and manufactures. Excluding developing
countries' inter-regional trade, the thirteen major "unaffected"
trade flows listed in Table 2 account for thirty-eight percent of
world trade, but the first five flows are of key importance as they
comprise over two-thirds of this total. Clearly, if one is to ex-
amine the potential further spread of regional arrangements and
its implications for global negotiations and trading conditions,
these are the flows upon which one should focus.
Our individual analysis of these bilateral flows in Table 348
suggests that, unless there are radical and unexpected develop-
ments, it is unlikely that FTA arrangements could be concluded
among the involved countries. For example, approximately $200
billion, or almost one-sixth of global unaffected trade, occurs be-
tween North America and Western Europe. Disputes between
the main trade actors in these regions, the United States and
the European Union (EU), were the main obstacles in conclud-
ing the Uruguay Round. Although, generally speaking, mini-
lateral arrangements may help overcome multilateral
negotiation problems, it is difficult to conclude that the particu-
lar points of contention, such as those relating to agricultural
trade policy issues, could be more easily resolved in an FTA as
opposed to MTN negotiations. Similar problems occur in other
trade flows, such as those between Australia/New Zealand and
the EU. North America-Japan and Japan-Western Europe ac-
count for a further one-fifth of the unaffected trade flows, and it
is again difficult to see how bilateral FTA deals could be estab-
lished here. In both markets, Japan has been the objective of
important discriminatory trade barriers49 and the sense that Ja-
pan does not "play by the rules" has produced some rather stri-
dent calls for further protective measures. 50 In these cases
"managed trade" appears to be a more likely outcome than a
FTA arrangement. 5 '
48. Only bilateral trade flows in excess of U.S. $50 billion are reported in
Table 3.
49. See SAM LAIRD & ALEXANDER YEATS, QUANTITATIVE METHODS FOR
TRADE-BARRIER ANALYSIS (1990).
50. For a discussion of the so-called "Japan question,' see BHAGWATI, supra
note 19, at 24-44.
51. See infra Section V.
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The possibility of a minilateral arrangement between Japan
and other Asian countries, however, cannot be dismissed as eas-
ily. Actually, there have been proposals supporting such an
idea. For example, the Prime Minister of Malaysia advanced the
concept of an East Asia Economic Group in 1991.52 We believe,
however, that the export orientation of the Asian economies
tends to inhibit the attractiveness of any proposal which would
entail explicit discrimination against outsiders, particularly the
United States (see Table 3).53
Among the potential FTA arrangements falling below the
US $50 billion "cut-off" used for Table 3, there is one that merits
special attention: an FTA between the United States and Latin
American countries as suggested by the Enterprise for the
Americas Initiative (EAI).5 4 With the conclusion of NAFTA, at-
tention may now be given to the EA. However, there are impor-
tant obstacles to its implementation.
First, there are significant differences in the level and char-
acter of protection between these countries; these differences
often vary directly with levels of development. For example,
Erzan and Yeats found that less than ten percent of exports
from Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru or Venezuela to the United
States faced tariffs greater than five percent and, with the ex-
ception of textiles and clothing under the Multi-Fiber Arrange-
ment (MFA) and some agricultural products, few nontariff
barriers were encountered.55 In contrast, this same study found
that U.S. exports to Latin America face tariffs that average fif-
52. See OECD, supra note 32, at 63.
53. It is worth noting that arrangements like the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-
operation (APEC) that work as a forum for exchanging views on economic
themes among participating economies do not fit our definition of a regional
trading bloc because they do not entail trade preferences negotiated on a recip-
rocal basis.
54. For a series of papers discussing the EAI, see THE PREMISE AND THE
PROMISE: FREE TRADE IN THE AMERICAS (Sylvia Saborio ed., 1992).
55. REFIK ERzAN & ALEXANDER YEATS, FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS WITH THE
UNITED STATES: WHATS IN IT FOR LATIN AMERICA? (World Bank PPR Working
Paper No. 360, 1991). Many tariffs of less than five percent resulted from gen-
eral across-the-board tariff cutting procedures applied in previous MTNs, and it
is often suggested that they have insignificant trade effects. In fact, one propo-
sal in the current multilateral negotiations termed them "nuisance tariffs" and
suggested they be dropped automatically. The relatively low tariff barriers fac-
ing Latin American exports to the United States are due to several factors:
tariff reductions negotiated in previous MTNs; existing preference schemes like
the GSP or CBI; and the concentration of some countries' exports on raw mater-
ials that have traditionally faced zero or low trade barriers. The Asian NICs
would have a much higher incentive to explore FTA arrangements due to the
more restrictive barriers they often face.
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teen to fifty percent in different countries and are subject to a
large number of nontariff measures. 56 This evidence suggests
that there would be implementation difficulties since FTA gains,
from a mercantilistic perspective, would be skewed toward the
United States - the country facing the highest trade barriers.57
Second, as the debate concerning the approval of NAFTA in
the U.S. Congress illustrated, trade arrangements involving de-
veloped and developing countries raise distributive issues, since
most North-South trade flows can be characterized as inter-in-
dustry trade. Accordingly, trade creation generated by the ar-
rangement is perceived as a competitive threat by non-skilled
labor in the developed economy and, as such, these arrange-
ments involve costly political negotiations.
Third, the accession clause of the NAFTA agreement re-
quires unanimous approval of any new prospective partici-
pant.58 It is hard to imagine that Mexico would be anxious to
see other Latin American countries accede to NAFTA. The ac-
cession of new countries would erode Mexico's preferential ac-
cess to the U.S. and Canadian markets, particularly if these new
members have similar resource endowments as do the other
larger Latin American economies.
V. THE MANAGED TRADE ALTERNATIVE
While our assessment of the likelihood of FTAs being nego-
tiated for the major trade flows currently "unaffected" was not
optimistic (see Table 3), this does not suggest that multilateral
disciplines are, or will continue to be, binding as far as these
flows are concerned. Drawing on trade intervention data for the
United States, Table 4 demonstrates that a high proportion of
these major inter-regional trade flows "unaffected" by mini-
lateral trade arrangements take place under "discriminatory"
trade barriers reflecting managed trade conditions (particularly
56. Id.
57. It can be argued that this danger will be minimized by the U.S. negoti-
ating strategy for the EAI, which seems to stress the need for Latin American
and Caribbean countries to implement significant structural reforms (including
trade liberalization) before embarking on FTA negotiations with the United
States. In any case, it seems unlikely that a FTA encompassing the entire
Western Hemisphere will be put in place in the near future. For further details
on Latin American and Caribbean countries reactions to the EAI, see C.A.
Primo Braga, NAFTA and the Rest of the World, in NORTH AMERICAN FREE
TRADE: ASSESSING THE IMPACT (N. Lustig et al. eds., 1992).
58. NAFTA art. 2205:2. See GARY C. HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT,
NAFTA: AN ASSESSMENT 115 (1993).
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VERs) and/or are influenced by "unfair trade" laws - particu-
larly countervailing duties and anti-dumping concerns.5 9 It is
also clear from Table 4 that Japan is the main target of U.S.
managed trade initiatives. Specifically, $68 billion of U.S. im-
ports from Japan are subject to discriminatory measures -
more than thirteen times the combined U.S. imports from Ger-
many, France and the U.K subject to such discriminatory meas-
ures.
As Table 4 suggests, managed trade has a major role in
shaping current international trade relations. One should not
infer from this data, however, "that rules do not work and more
managed trade must, therefore, be the way to go."60 Neverthe-
less, if the Uruguay Round agreements prove to be less than sat-
isfactory, the cause of those who believe that a "fixed-quantity"
trading regime built around managed trade practices is an inevi-
table development would be advanced. Such a development
could not only impede the rollback of the large array of already
existing discriminatory trade barriers, but also foster their use
in sectors such as technologically advanced products which are
characterized by significant trade dynamism.
Advocates of managed trade have used different rationales
to justify government intervention. These "rationales," as far as
motivations are concerned, can be classified as follows:
macroeconomic, systemic, and sectoral or microeconomic. 61 The
deterioration of the U.S. current account over the 1980s, for ex-
ample, has led to several proposals - usually focusing on the
U.S.-Japan bilateral imbalance - in favor of quantitative trade
targets in the context of a macroeconomic rationale.62 Managed
59. The non-tariff barriers (NTBs) listed in Table 4 are discriminatory in
that they are directed against specific countries whereas other measures, like
global quotas or variable import levies, do not differentiate among foreign sup-
pliers. As indicated, the U.S. discriminatory measures are very heavily concen-
trated on Japan - particularly Japanese exports of high technology products.
The authors have undertaken a separate analysis of EU discriminatory trade
barriers and also found that these restrictions are primarily directed at Japan
(results available from the authors on request). With Canada, United States,
and Sweden as the combined comparator group, our results indicated that over
90% of EC discriminatory protection was directed against Japanese exports.
For additional information on the application of NTBs by major trading na-
tions, see LAIRD & YEATS, supra note 49.
60. BHAGWATI, supra note 19, at 23.
61. For analyses of the different meanings of "managed trade," see
BHAGWATI, supra note 19, at 23-47, and Tyson, supra note 6, at 146-50.
62. See, e.g., Henry Kissinger & Cyrus Vance, Bipartisan Objectives for
Foreign Policies, 66 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 899 (1988); CLYDE V. PRESTOWITZ, JR.,
TRADING PLACES: How WE ALLOWED JAPAN TO TAKE THE LEAD (1988); RUDIGER
[Vol. 3:231
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MINN. J GLOBAL TRADE
trade is presented in most of these proposals as an instrument to
force U.S. trade partners to open their markets. The limitations
of this approach to "correct" U.S. current account deficits are
well known. Nevertheless, supporters claim that the increase in
demand for U.S. goods would tend to ease, via a terms-of-trade
effect, the impact of a fiscal-induced real income adjustment.
A "systemic" rationale in favor of managed trade, in turn,
has been developed by those concerned with the so-called "Japan
question".63 According to this perspective, Japanese policies re-
veal a cultural preference for a "fixed-quantity" trade regime as
opposed to a rules-oriented regime.6 4 Therefore, the only way to
effectively negotiate the opening of the Japanese economy is to
implement managed trade practices. This rationale is based on
the thesis that Japan is an outlier among trading nations -
more precisely, that Japan is a relatively closed economy. To the
extent that the accuracy of this proposition remains open to de-
bate, the economic relevance of the systemic argument is also
questionable. 65
Sectoral or microeconomic rationales, although equally con-
troversial, have provided the most popular arguments used to
support managed trade initiatives. In the past, these initiatives
were often framed as defensive actions to ease the adjustment of
mature industries in the industrialized countries.66 Accusations
of unfair trade practices by dynamic exporters were also a com-
W. DORNBUSCH ET AL., MEETING WORLD CHALLENGES: U.S. MANUFACTURING IN
THE 1990s (1989).
63. BHAGWATI, supra note 19, at 24-44.
64. See, e.g., James Fallows, Containing Japan, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May
1989, at 40.
65. Some authors argue that Japan is, vis-a-vis other OECD countries, a
closed economy. See Robert Lawrence, Imports in Japan: Closed Markets or
Minds, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 517 (1987); BELA BALASSA
& M. H. NOLAND, JAPAN IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (1988); Rudiger W. Dorn-
busch, Policy Options for Freer Trade: The Case for Bilateralism, in AN AMERI-
CAN TRADE STRATEGY: OPTIONS FOR THE 1990s (Robert Z. Lawrence & Charles
Schultze eds., 1990). Other authors, in turn, dispute this conclusion. See G.R.
Saxonhouse, What's Wrong with Japanese Trade Structure (Seminar Discussion
Paper, 166 University of Michigan, 1985); BHAGWATI, supra note 19. For a re-
view of the related literature, see Kenji Takeuchi, Does Japan Import Less
Than It Should? (World Bank PRE Working Paper, WPS 63, 1988), and T.N.
Srinivasan, Is Japan an Outlier Among Trading Countries?, in TRADE THEORY
AND ECONOMIC REFORM: NORTH, SOUTH, AND EAST (Jaime de Melo & Andre
Sapir eds., 1991).
66. This policy is exemplified by the adoption of the Multi Fiber Arrange-
ment (MFA) to protect the textiles and clothing industries of developed econo-
mies. For more details on the MFA, see WORLD BANK, supra note 14, at 136-37.
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mon characteristic of defensive managed trade policies. 67 More
recently, however, the demand for managed trade has become
increasingly associated with the aspiration to promote "strate-
gic" industries in order to foster national competitiveness. 68
This development, in part, reflects the perception that Japan
has successfully targeted "strategic" industries.69 This percep-
tion, reinforced by the economic success of a few followers of the
Japanese-paradigm, has given a new appeal to interventionist
trade and industrial policies, at least as far as policy makers are
concerned. At the same time, a flurry of theoretical contribu-
tions in the context of the so-called "strategic trade theory" have
seemingly given a new "respectability" to interventionist
policies. 70
In this Article, we simply argue that the major "unaffected"
trade flows identified in Table 2 provide fertile ground for fur-
ther managed trade initiatives. Our analysis reflects the follow-
ing considerations: (1) currently, high-technology industries are
the preferred choice for those who support the "strategic indus-
67. See, e.g., the role of U.S. dumping and subsidy investigations in paving
the way for the steel VRAs negotiated by the United States and major steel
exporters in the 1980s. See KENT JONES, POLITICS VS. ECONOMICS IN WORLD
STEEL TRADE (1986).
68. Tyson, supra note 6, at 153-62.
69. There is no consensus on the precise meaning of the term "strategic
industry." Most of the contributions in this area tend to list high sunk costs in
R&D, "positive externalities, large economies of scale based on learning by do-
ing, and important upstream and downstream linkages" among the typical at-
tributes of strategic industries. Wolfgang Michalski, Support Policies for
Strategic Industries: An Introduction to the Main Issues, in STRATEGIC INDUS-
TRIES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: POLICY ISSUES FOR THE 1990s, at 9 (1991). As
Barrie Stevens points out, however, the fundamental issue here is "the fact that
many governments [in spite of the non-existence of an accepted working defini-
tion] are able to identify what they perceive to be 'strategic' industries and are
willing to promote them with specific policies." Barrie Stevens, Support Policies
for Strategic Industries: An Assessment and Some Policy Recommendations, in
STRATEGIC INDUSTRIES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: POLICY ISSUES FOR THE 1990s,
supra, at 98.
70. For a review of the strategic trade theory, see, e.g, Paul Krugman, Stra-
tegic Sectors and International Competition, in U.S. TRADE POLICIES IN A
CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY 207 (Robert M. Stern ed., 1987), and Elhanan
Helpman, The Noncompetitive Theory of International Trade and Trade Policy,
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORLD BANK ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMICS 193 (1989). For critical analyses see, e.g., Avinash K. Dixit, Trade
Policy: An Agenda for Research, in STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY AND THE NEW IN-
TERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 283 (Paul R. Krugman ed., 1987), Jagdish Bhagwati,
Is Free Trade Passe After All?, WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHES ARCHlV. 3-30 (1989),
and Gottfried Haberler, Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Eco-
nomics: A Critical Analysis, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 25 (Ronald W. Jones & Anne 0. Krueger eds., 1990).
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try" argument; (2) the relative importance of high-tech trade7'
vis-a-vis global trade flows has increased significantly over the
last three decades from about ten percent in world trade volume
in 1965 to twenty-two percent in 1989 as shown in Table 5; (3)
the United States is perceived to be losing competitiveness in
high-tech sectors; 72 and (4) Japan has assumed a commanding
position in high-tech trade. As portrayed in Table 5, the United
71. High-tech products are defined as products for which investment in the
creation of knowledge are responsible for a substantial share of their production
costs. A high-tech industry is usually defined in terms of its factor inputs (e.g.,
the relative intensity of research and development (R & D) investments, or the
proportion of scientists and engineers in the labor force). The better known
high-tech definitions are reviewed in VICTORIA L. HATTER, U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, INT'L TRADE ADMIN., U.S. HIGH TECHNOLOGY TRADE AND COMPETITIVE-
NESS (1985).
We adopted the definition proposed in LESTER A. DAVIS, TECHNOLOGY IN-
TENSITY OF U.S. OUTPUT AND TRADE (1988), which estimates the technology in-
tensity for any given industry in the United States in terms of the R&D
expenditures required to produce a certain manufactured good. This methodol-
ogy takes into account not only the direct R&D investments made by final pro-
ducers, but also the indirect R&D expenditures made by suppliers of
intermediate goods used in the production of the final good. The "indirect" R&D
contribution was estimated by Davis using input-output techniques. Id. Based
on the U.S. Standard Industrial Classification (SIC), industries were ranked
according to their R&D intensity and the first ten SIC groups (3-digit classifica-
tion) were designated as high-tech industries. Id. The industry ranked as
number 10 had an R&D index 30% greater than the industry in eleventh place
and more than 100% above the average for the manufacturing sector as a
whole. Id. In other words, Davis' methodology imposes a much higher stan-
dard in terms of R&D intensity than the "above average level" criteria often
adopted in the literature. In order to translate Davis' industry classification
into a definition of high-tech trade, we used the concordance between the SIC
grouping and the SITC Revision 1 classification proposed by Hatter. HATTER,
supra. Given the imperfect match between SIC and SITC codes, Hatter esti-
mated high-tech weights (the proportion of US high-tech imports and exports in
each given SITC group, based on 1975-1977 US trade data) as a way to high-
light the relative importance of high-tech products in any given SITC grouping.
Id. In preparing our data on high-tech trade, we considered only those SITC
groups (at 4-digit level) which presented a high-tech weight greater or equal to
50%. It is worth mentioning that the appropriateness of this methodology relies
on the assumption that the use of U.S. input-output relations and trade pat-
terns for high-tech production does not introduce a perverse bias in the
classification.
72. Revealed comparative advantage (RCA) indices for high-tech trade do
not confirm this perception for the 1968-88 period. The RCA index is defined as
follows: RCA, = (x-/X.)/(xJiX,,) where the w subscripts indicate world totals, t
represents all manufactured goods, xi denotes a certain category of manufac-
tured exports (in this case high-tech goods), and j is a country. Values above
unity are taken to indicate that the country has a comparative advantage on
high-tech products. In the case of the United States, the index for high-tech
products was 1.56 in 1968 and 1.59 in 1988. Yet, the significant increase in
competitiveness of Japan (the RCA for high-tech products increased from 1.05
19941
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States ran a $24 billion trade deficit in high technology trade
with Japan in 198973 and these products were often the focus of
U.S. discriminatory trade restrictions imposed against Japan.
Growing U.S. trade deficits in high-tech trade vis-a-vis Ja-
pan and the Asian NIEs, together with the perception that their
success has been fostered by government intervention, is an ad-
ditional factor eroding U.S. support for the non-interventionist
approach with respect to high-tech industries. In the EU, the
search for European "champions" in high-tech sectors provides
another likely source of additional managed trade initiatives
against not only East Asian firms, but also U.S. companies. 74
There is also a growing recognition that existing multilateral
trade disciplines are not sufficient to avoid international trade
frictions in high-tech sectors. 75 Accordingly, there have been
proposals for drafting a code for innovation policies - encom-
passing trade, research and development, competition, and for-
eign direct investment policies, as well as financial market
regulation - at the OECD level as a means to promote policy-
convergence over the long run.7 6 Such an initiative clearly re-
flects a desire to create a fixed-rule multilateral regime for high-
tech industries in order to avoid the proliferation of managed
trade initiatives. However, the prospects of such a code being
implemented in the near future seem dim at best.
VI. FINAL COMMENTS
Fears about the proliferation of minilateral initiatives are
qualified by the analyses presented in this Article. Once
NAFTA and the potential agreements between the EU and East-
ern European countries are taken into account, remaining major
trade flows are not likely candidates for minilateral arrange-
ments, at least for the near future. Managed trade initiatives
seem to pose a larger threat to the multilateral trade system in a
post-Uruguay Round world than the emergence of new preferen-
to 1.33 over the same period) and some NIEs (in the case of Singapore it jumped
from 0.49 to 2.23) may explain the perception of relative U.S. decline.
73. The EC deficit in high-tech trade with Japan was $19 billion in 1989.
74. See, e.g., the analysis of the EC's evolving trade and industrial policies
for the electronics industry in LAURA D'ANDREA TYSON, WHO'S BASHING WHOM?
TRADE CONFLICT IN HIGH-TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES ch. 6 (1992).
75. Tyson, supra note 6, at 150-53.
76. SYLVIA OSTRY, GOVERNMENTS AND CORPORATIONS IN A SHRINKING
WORLD (1990); Sylvia Ostry, Beyond the Border: The New International Policy
Arena, in OECD STRATEGIC INDUSTRIES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: POLICY ISSUES
FOR THE 1990S (1991).
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tial trading blocs. Furthermore, high-tech trade is a natural
candidate for additional managed trade initiatives. This, in
turn, may increase the danger of trading blocs turning hostile to
each other due to the competitiveness and nationalistic impor-
tance of the high-tech industry.
If events proceed along these lines, developing countries
may have to deal with some unpleasant realities in the 1990s. It
is doubtful that minilateralism will be rolled back from its cur-
rent high profile as far as trade flows are concerned, and man-
aged trade practices will continue to add strain to the frail
multilateral trading system built around the GATT, fostering a
power-based system of international economic relations. It is
improbable, to say the least, that developing countries will bene-
fit from such a development.
Annex
List of Major Regional Integration Arrangements
AM Arab Maghreb Union (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco,
Tunisia). 77
Andean Pact Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela.
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations (Brunei, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand).
CACM Central American Common Market (Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua).
CARICOM Caribbean Common Market (Antigua and Barbuda,
Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica,
Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent,
Trinidad and Tobago).
EC European Communities (Belgium, Denmark, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom).
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States (Benin,
Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania,
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo).
EFTA European Free Trade Association (Austria, Finland, Iceland,
Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland).
EC-EFTA A protocol allows for free trade in manufactured goods
between these two trading blocs since 1973. The
establishment of the European Economic Area (EEA) was
agreed to in 1991.
77. This arrangement remains largely unimplemented, but a program of
preferential liberalization has been recently approved. See UNCTAD,
"Regional and Subregional Economic Integration and Cooperation Among
Developing Countries: Adjusting to Changing Realities" (The African Case),
UNCTAD/ECDC/228 (1992) (on file with the authors).
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GCC
LAIA
MERCOSUR
SADCC-PTA
UDEAC
Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates).
Latin American Integration Association (Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru,
Uruguay, Venezuela).
Southern Cone Common Market (Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay, Uruguay)
South African Development Coordination Conference
(Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mali, Mozambique, Swaziland,
Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe) and Preferential Trade Area
of Eastern and Southern African States (members of
SADCC, minus Angola, plus Burundi, Comoros, Ethiopia,
Kenya, Mauritius, Rwanda, Somalia).
Central African Customs and Economic Union (Cameroon,
Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea,
Gabon).
